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 2 
The Arrival 
“A crowd numbering three or four thousand people assembled at Darwen 
Station…when the train was heard to be entering the station, there was a 
babel [sic] of eager voices, and every eye was focused on the station exit, 
but hopes were quickly dashed to the ground and the crowd was greatly 
disappointed when the first passenger to see the gathering shouted, ‘You 
can all go home.  He got off at Spring Vale [sic].’”1 
 
Darwen and Springvale were economically depressed cotton towns in Lancashire, 
England; “he” was Mohandas Gandhi, leader of the Indian National Congress, whose 
boycott of English cotton goods was at its height; and the anticipation and 
disappointment manifested at the railroad station set the stage for the rest of the visit.  In 
1931, the Lancashire textile industry had been in a depression for ten years, with huge 
losses especially in its exports to the Indian market.  The Indian boycott, though only one 
factor, and not a very important one, in Lancashire’s decline, was targeted by 
industrialists and trade unionists alike as the main cause of the trade depression.  At the 
same time, Indian nationalists blamed Lancashire for the suppression of the Indian textile 
industry.  Given this animosity, it seems surprising that Lancashire would be eager to 
host Gandhi or that Gandhi would travel to Lancashire.  Yet Gandhi and Lancashire mill 
owners and workers embraced the opportunity to engage in “frank and friendly 
discussion” of the problems surrounding Lancashire and India’s economic relationship.2   
Gandhi arrived in Springvale at 11 p.m. on Friday, September 25, 1931 to be 
greeted “by hand-clapping and cheers.”3  He visited several mill towns before his 
departure at 10 p.m. on Sunday, September 27, 1931.  During that time he stayed with 
non-conformist, progressive industrialists.  He met with the Mayor of Darwen and the 
                                            
1
 “Darwen Houses Mr. Gandhi: At Darwen Railway Station,” The Darwen News [henceforth DN], September 26, 
1931, p. 10. 
2
 British Library, India Office Records [henceforth BL/IOR] L/PO/1/30, letter, Joint Committee of Cotton Trades 
Organisation [henceforth JCCTO] to William Wedgwood Been, Secretary of State for India, July 25, 1931. 
3
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Mayor of Preston, with mill owners, with Manchester traders, with workers from both 
spinning and weaving districts, and with legions of journalists.  Newspaper sources in 
Lancashire and India reveal the contradictory expectations of the Indian and English 
participants of the visit.  A story told in the Blackburn Northern Daily Telegraph neatly 
illustrates what people in Lancashire wanted the visit to be like.  While standing on the 
lawn with some workers,  
“The Mahatma then approached a woman carrying a child.  He stroked the 
child’s face.  ‘Get hold of the baby, Mr Gandhi,’ some one [sic] shouted, 
so he extended both arms.  The youngster made no move, and Mr Gandhi 
asked in mock despair, ‘What can I do?’ After more coaxing, the baby 
smiled back.  The mother blushed and neighbours laughed as the Darwen 
baby and the Indian leader became friends.”4 
Lancashire society anticipated that the “civility and kindliness… simplicity and peace” of 
Lancashire air would soothe “even deep differences of opinion.”5  Gandhi’s “native 
sympathy [would] materialise in favour of Lancashire’s workless”6 and he would end the 
boycott, thus returning Lancashire to its former full volume of trade.  However, this 
effect did not materialize.  Gandhi, while sympathetic to Lancashire’s economic troubles, 
saw the visit as an opportunity to educate Lancashire on the nature of Indian nationalism, 
not to rescue the unemployed textile workers of Lancashire.  He told his audience that the 
boycott was not the main cause of their depression and that the boycott was a social and 
spiritual necessity for Indian peasants.7  In spite of the rhetoric about dialogue used by 
both sides prior to the visit, Gandhi and Lancashire society8 remained too rooted in their 
own historical and cultural contexts to successfully communicate with each other.   
                                            
4
 Lancashire’s Poverty: Workless Deputation,” BNDT, September 26, 1931, p. 4. 
5
 “Birds and Empire Drama: Mr Gandhi’s day in the country,” BNDT, September 28, 1931, p. 3. 
6
  “Mr. Gandhi,” DN, September 26, 1931, p. 5. 
7
 See for example: “Mr. Gandhi’s visit to West Bradford: Indian Poverty,” BNDT, October 2, 1931, p. 5; “Cold 
Comfort from Mr Gandhi: India able to do little for Lancashire: India’s Standard of Living,” BNDT, September 28, 
1931, p. 6. 
8
 A note about my use of the terms “Lancashire society” or “cotton society”: By no means do I intend to imply that the 
Lancashire cotton industry was a homogenous group.  People in the cotton industry were very diverse in their social 
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The Anticipation 
Months of anticipation had preceded Gandhi’s arrival at Springvale Station on 
that September night.  The visit was originally suggested by Charles Freer Andrews, a 
non-conformist minister and a close friend of Gandhi.  Andrews went to Lancashire in 
June 1931 and was greatly disturbed by the poverty he saw there.  He wrote to workers 
and mill owners, to Gandhi, and to William Wedgwood Benn, the Secretary of State for 
India, proposing that Gandhi meet with people involved in the Lancashire textile industry 
in an attempt to heal the resentment between the two parties.9  Andrews’ proposal seemed 
to be a success; mill owners and mill workers in Lancashire enthusiastically supported 
the idea10 and Gandhi also indicated willingness to speak to Lancashire if he came to 
England.11  Gandhi’s attendance at the Round Table Conference in London to consult on 
the future constitution of India provided the perfect opportunity for such a trip.   
The language used before the visit certainly seemed to indicate that 
communication would be possible.  Both sides spoke of dialogue, of friendliness, of 
reaching a mutual understanding.  In a letter to Andrews, Gandhi wrote, he would “gladly 
see Lancashire friends immediately on arrival.”12  He claimed that during his visit he 
would attempt to “remove any misunderstanding” in the “minds of the people of 
Lancashire.”13   Likewise, the Joint Committee of Cotton Trades Organisations, the main 
coalition of Lancashire mill owners, responded to Andrews’ suggestion of a visit by 
                                                                                                                                  
and economic experiences and their political viewpoints.  Later in the paper I will explore some of the tensions within 
the textile industry.  Given how diverse cotton society was, it is all the more striking how unanimous these different 
groups are on issues surrounding the boycott, Lancashire’s economic decline, and Gandhi’s visit.  In these matters, at 
least, Lancashire seemed to speak with one voice.   
9
 BL/IOR/L/PO/1/48, letter, C. F. Andrews to Lord Irwin, Viceroy of India, June 8, 1931.  
10
 BL/IOR/L/PO/1/30, letter, JCCTO to Wedgwood Benn, July 25, 1931; BL/IOR/L/PO/1/48, letter, C. F. Andrews to 
Lord Irwin, Viceroy of India, June 8, 1931. 
11
 BL/IOR/L/PO/1/48, copy of telegram, Mohandas Gandhi to Andrews, n.d., enclosed in letter, Andrews to 
Wedgwood Benn, June 20 1931. 
12
 BL/IOR/L/PO/1/48, copy of telegram, Gandhi to Andrews, n.d., enclosed in letter, Andrews to Wedgwood Benn, 
June 20, 1931. 
13
 “Interview to the Press,” September 12, 1931, in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi [henceforth CWMG] v. 
48 (September 1931-January 1932) (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Press, 1971), 6. 
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informing Wedgwood Benn that Lancashire would be happy to engage in “a frank and 
friendly discussion” with Gandhi in the hopes that such a discussion would “remove 
some of the misunderstandings which appear to exist in India as well as in Lancashire.”14 
The afternoon before Gandhi arrived, Greenfield Mill Co., Ltd. posted a sign on their mill 
doors declaring, “We welcome Mr. Gandhi in the spirit of friendliness on this visit.”15  At 
first glance it seems that the rhetoric used by both sides indicated a unity of purpose that 
boded well for the outcome of the visit. 
The similar vocabulary used by Gandhi and representatives of the textile industry, 
however, masked very different intentions.  The textile workers and mill owners expected 
that the discussion would focus on Lancashire’s poverty and would induce Gandhi to end 
the boycott.  Gandhi saw the visit to Lancashire as part of a larger mission to explain the 
Indian National Congress’ cause to British citizens in the hopes of gaining electoral 
support for Indian independence.  These divergent expectations came from the very 
different histories of the two parties, to which I now turn.  
“Custom-bound, ageing, inward-looking”16: Lancashire’s reactions to the 
depression 
At the time of the visit, the Lancashire cotton industry was in the middle of its 
most severe depression, a depression that had started in 1922 and would last until the 
final demise of the industry some thirty years later.   Despite the hard times, however, 
most people in the cotton industry confidently awaited a return to better times.  And the 
good times in Lancashire had been very good indeed.  Since the nineteenth century 
Lancashire had been the site of the world’s premier cotton-goods industry.  Manchester 
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 BL/IOR/L/PO/1/30, letter, JCCTO to Wedgwood Benn, July 25, 1931. 
15
 “Mr. Gandhi’s Visit: Statement by the Greenfield Mill Co., Ltd.,” DN, September 26, 1931, p. 1. 
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 John K. Walton, Lancashire: a social history, 1558-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 352. 
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and the surrounding region were at the forefront of Britain’s industrial revolution.  
Although there were other industries in Lancashire (mining and shipping, primarily), 
Lancashire was predominantly a textiles region.  In many towns, the mills were the only 
source of income for working families.  In the nineteenth century, the Empire provided 
ever-expanding markets for the goods produced by those mills, as well as becoming a 
source of cheap raw cotton.17  In 1913, almost sixty percent of Lancashire’s cotton 
products, or three billion yards of cloth, were sent from Lancashire mills to India.18  The 
First World War permanently altered these patterns of production and trade, dealing 
Lancashire a blow from which it would never recover.  During the war years, 
Lancashire’s cotton industry stagnated while Indian, Japanese, and U.S. competitors 
implemented new, more efficient technology and organization.19  In India, the 
competition from native and Japanese mills was combined with nationalist opposition to 
British goods.  In 1922, the government in Delhi was given fiscal autonomy, with the 
result that tariffs on British goods shot up to twenty-five percent by 1931.20  In 1929, the 
Indian National Congress instituted a nation-wide boycott of English textiles.  
Lancashire’s outdated technology and organization and foreign competition were the 
main factors in the decline in Lancashire trade, but the tariffs and the boycott exacerbated 
                                            
17
 India, Egypt, and Latin America, all of which took large quantities of Lancashire textiles, were also the major 
growers of raw cotton.  Alan Fowler, Lancashire Cotton Operatives and Work, 1900-1950: A Social History of 
Lancashire Cotton Operatives in the Twentieth Century, Modern Economic and Social History Series, ed. Derek H. 
Aldcroft (Hants, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), 10. 
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 Sixty percent of Lancashire’s export trade went to the “Far East,” which comprised India and China, with the 
majority going to India.  Rex Pope, Unemployment and the Lancashire Weaving Area, 1920-1938, Harris Paper Three 
(Preston, England: University of Central Lancashire, 2000): 9-10. 
19
 Walton, Lancashire, 326.   
20
 Andrew Muldoon, “‘An Unholy Row in Lancashire’: The Textile Lobby, Conservative Politics, and Indian Policy, 
1931-1935,” Twentieth Century British History 14, no. 2 (2003): 94.  Although the Delhi government was still 
controlled by British politicians, not Indians, the politicians in India were more likely to respond to Indian pressure 
groups than the London government was.  The decision to shift control over Indian’s economic policy from London to 
Delhi in 1922 was hotly contested by many in Britain, including a vocal Lancashire group.  See: S.C. Ghosh,  “Pressure 
and Privilege: The Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the Indian Problem, 1930-1934,” Parliamentary Affairs 18 
(1965): 204.  Tariffs were also erected after the war in the Far East and in Latin America, Lancashire’s other big 
markets (Fowler, Cotton Operatives, 8). 
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Lancashire’s problems, as did the stock market crash in 1929.  The repercussions of this 
chain of events on Lancashire were dramatic. “Between 1924 and 1935…cotton fell from 
third to eleventh place among British industries in value of net output.”21  In March 1931, 
24,000 out of 90,000 looms in one weaving town had closed and another 46,000 had 
stopped indefinitely.22  In 1931, the year of Gandhi’s visit, one in three cotton workers 
was unemployed.23  Cotton society searched desperately for a way in which to explain the 
industry’s precipitous decline.   
Lancashire’s attitude to the depression, the textile industry’s interpretation of the 
causes of decline, and Lancashire society’s reaction to Gandhi were all mediated by a 
romanticized memory of the nineteenth century cotton industry. Throughout the early 
twentieth century, Lancashire society was undergoing enormous economic and social 
changes, all of which seemed to bring destruction and despair.  As a result, people were 
very resistant to innovations.  Instead, everyone looked backwards to an idealized version 
of the cotton industry’s golden age in the nineteenth century as the standard for the 
future.  The language of conciliation used during the visit, the resistance to 
rationalization, the representation of nineteenth century trading patterns as normal, and 
the expectation of imminent revival for the industry all emanated from a commitment to 
reinstating the nineteenth century cotton industry. 
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 A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, vol. 15 of The Oxford History of England, ed. Sir George Clark (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 304-5.   
22
 BL/IOR/L/PO/1/48, Précis of the Statement made to the Meeting of Lancashire members of Parliament, by 
Representatives of the Cotton Spinners’ and Manufacturers’ Association and the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners’ 
Associations Ltd., March 13, 1931. 
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 Walton, Lancashire, 341; Fowler, Cotton Operatives, 76. 
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“Minimising the friction and distress”24: The language of conciliation and its roots 
in Lancashire’s labor relations 
Although strategies of friendliness and compromise were advocated by both 
Gandhi and representatives of the cotton industry, the two parties anticipated very 
different outcomes from the dialogue that they promoted.  Lancashire cotton society 
anticipated certain results from conciliation and face-to-face interaction with Gandhi. 
These expectations emerged from the history of labor relations in Lancashire.  Lancashire 
was famous (in some circles, infamous) for amicable relations between trade unions and 
employers. Trade union officials tended to be much more upwardly mobile than in other 
regions.25   In 1931, Luke Bates, the secretary of the Blackburn Weavers’ Association, 
was also Mayor of Blackburn.  Both Bates and Andrew Naesmith, secretary of the 
Weavers’ Amalgamation, were referred to as Esquire, a social distinction that was rare 
for a member of the working class. Several other trade union members were Justices of 
the Peace. The social proximity between trade union officials and employers, as well as 
the small-town nature of the cotton industry, meant that much value was placed on face-
to-face interaction and reconciliation.26  The emphasis on “personal contact” with Gandhi 
was an extension of Lancashire’s standard operating procedure for resolving conflict.27  
The statement posted on the doors of the Greenfield Mill asserted this basic philosophy: 
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 “Gandhi’s Week-End: Talks to Mayor and Workless,” Blackburn Northern Daily Telegraph [henceforth BNDT], 
September 24, 1931, p. 4. 
25
 Patrick Joyce, Visions of the People: Industrial England and the question of class 1848-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 137.  Eddie Cass, Alan Fowler, and Terry Wyke, “The Remarkable Rise and Long Decline of 
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and London: Greenwood Press, 1978), 87. 
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 “Darwen Houses Mr. Gandhi,” DN, September 26, 1931, p. 10. 
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“We believe it is only on a basis of reconciliation and co-operation that the future well-
being of both Lancashire and India can be built.”28  
The connotations of “conciliation” were affected by how Lancashire traditionally 
handled industrial disputes.   Andrew Flinn argues that “the conservative and cautious 
nature of much of the trade unionism in this period was…deeply rooted in occupational 
and community identities.”29  Strikes were rare and short-lived.30  Value was placed 
instead on consensus, with the result that workers often ended up capitulating to 
employers’ demands in order to keep the peace.31  The unions fully endorsed this 
“rhetoric of industrial peace”32 with the result that “collective bargaining machinery 
rapidly degenerated into a vehicle for autocratic employers to assert their right to manage 
as they saw fit.”33  When representatives of the cotton industry (both mill owners and 
operatives) argued that “friendly discussion”34 would resolve the tension between India 
and Lancashire, what they envisioned was a “reconciliation”35 that involved Gandhi’s 
total capitulation to Lancashire demands.  In the language used to describe the purpose of 
the visit, as in so many other things, Lancashire operatives and employers looked to their 
image of the “golden past” of Lancashire’s industrial history for the solutions of the 
future.   
                                            
28
 “Mr. Gandhi’s Visit,” DN, September 26, 1931, p. 1.  Also quoted in “Getting Ready for Mr Gandhi,” BNDT, 
September 25, 1931, p. 4.   See also: “Mr. Gandhi’s visit,” BNDT, September 26, 1931, p. 2. 
29
 Andrew Flinn, “Labour's family: local Labour parties, trade unions and trades councils in cotton Lancashire, 1931–
39”,  in Labour's grass roots : essays on the activities and experiences of local Labour parties and members, 1918-1945 
ed. Worley, Matthew, Studies in Labour History (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 118. 
30
 Fowler, Cotton Operatives, 76.  The situation was changing in the 1930s as the depression worsened and workers 
grew more desperate.  Generally, however, radical politics and labor conflicts were limited to the northwest weaving 
districts of Nelson and Colne (Fowler, Cotton Operatives, 76; Pope, Unemployment, 88, 125).   
31
 Fowler, Cotton Operatives, 76; Joyce, Visions, 115-6; Walton, Lancashire, 352; White, Militancy, 75-6. 
32
 Joyce, Visions, 116. 
33
 Walton, Lancashire, 352. 
34
 T. D. Barlow, quoted in “Gandhi’s Week-End: Talks to Mayor and Workless,” BNDT, September 24, 1931, p. 4. 
35
 “Mr. Gandhi’s Visit: Statement by the Greenfield Mill Co., Ltd.,” DN, September 26, 1931, p. 1. 
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“Taking a change for the better”36: the interpretation of economic decline as 
momentary 
Even after ten years of lowered production and exports, Lancashire remained 
confident that a revival of production levels was imminent.  The pre-war expansion of the 
industry “produced a series of statistics…which were to be the point of reference for the 
rest of the twentieth century.”37  The cotton industry could not “believe that Lancashire 
would not continue to be a major force in world cotton.”38  Throughout 1931, there 
remained a sense of constant watchfulness as slight statistical changes were reported with 
great import almost every week.  The Textile Mercury, a newspaper that catered to mill 
owners and Manchester traders, monitored changes in the Indian situation city by city, 
week by week.  On February 27, the paper stated that “[t]he opinion is growing that the 
Indian position has reached the turning point”; on March 6, an article rejoiced that 
“Lancashire found reason for renewed hope of much bigger things when the terms of the 
settlement of the political trouble in India were made known yesterday”; on March 13, 
the paper reported that “even in the storm centre of Bombay, dealers and Indian importers 
there are taking up their contracts after the lapse of many many [sic] months.”39  By 
October, the paper was enthusiastically (and incorrectly) declaring that the “Congress ban 
has practically ceased to operate.”40  The Cotton Factory Times, a paper whose 
sympathies were with the cotton operatives and which had a political agenda to the left of 
most of cotton society,41 echoed these optimistic assertions, with weekly bulletins of 
                                            
36
 “Darwen Trade: More Looms at Work,” The Cotton Factory Times [henceforth CFT], August 21, 1931, p. 3. 
37
 Fowler, Cotton Operatives, 5.  
38
 Cass et al, “The Remarkable Rise,” 153.  See also Andrew Thorpe, “The Industrial Meaning of ‘Gradualism’: The 
Labour Party and Industry, 1918-1931,” Journal of British Studies 35, no. 1 (1996), 107; Walton, Lancashire, 329. 
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 “World Textile Markets: Manchester Cotton,” Textile Mercury [henceforth TM], February 27, 1931, p. 197; 
“Lancashire and Peace in India,” TM, March 6, 1931, p. 207; “World Textile Markets: Southern India,” TM, March 13, 
1931, p. 244. 
40
 “World Cotton Markets: Manchester,” TM, October 2, 1931, p. 356. 
41
 Cass et al, “The Remarkable Rise,” 156. 
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hopes for improving trade in the near future (reports on actual improvements were much 
rarer than announcements of “anticipation” of increasing markets).42  Even when more 
pessimistic opinions were voiced, they were usually refuted within the same issue, if not 
within the same article.  In one of The Cotton Factory Times’ more negative articles, the 
author states that “[t]he past quarter…has been as bad, so far as unemployment is 
concerned, as 1930, and there does not seem any immediate hope for better times.”43  Yet 
he concludes the paragraph: “perhaps we can in the near future look for better times in 
Lancashire for the cotton trade.”44  This positive outlook was rooted in a fervent belief 
that Lancashire’s textile industry would continue to be as great as it had been in the 
nineteenth century. 
The resistance to rationalization, or improvements in organization and 
technology, stemmed from the assumption that since Lancashire had been at the head of 
the world’s cotton textile production for a century, it should continue to lead the world, 
without needing to update technology or organization. What had worked for Lancashire 
in the past was expected to continue working.45  Workers and employers discounted 
criticisms of Lancashire’s outdated industrial policy from “rank outsiders, politicians, and 
amateurs.”46   
                                            
42
 See for example: “Peace in India: Civil Disobedience Off,” CFT, March 6, 1931, p. 3; “Preston Spinners: Indian 
settlement hopes,” CFT, March 13, 1931, p. 4. 
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 “Heywood Cardroom: The Position in India,” CFT, April 17, 1931, p. 2. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Taylor, English History, 300; Walton, Lancashire, 354 
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Reply to Sir W. Preston,” unknown newspaper clipping, n.d.  See also: LRO/DDX11115/8/3, The Blackburn District 
Cotton Employers’ Association circulars, letter to T. Ashurst Esquire, March 30, 1931; LRO/DDX1274/6/3, The 
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Master Cotton Spinners Associations, Ltd.).  
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Rationalization was implemented in several other industries in Britain (with 
varying degrees of success) during the 1930s.47  Rationalization usually involved 
amalgamation among companies and the introduction of new technology.  In Lancashire, 
the major change in technology that was advocated was a shift from the nineteenth 
century technique of mule spinning to the new method of ring spinning.48  Those in favor 
of rationalization also argued for the combination of spinning and weaving companies 
into big concerns that could coordinate technological advances and wages.49  These 
innovations were adamantly opposed by both trade unionists and industrialists.50 As the 
situation in the industry became ever more dire in the 1920s and 1930s, owners and 
operatives occasionally used pro-rationalization rhetoric to undermine the other group.51  
Rationalization would surely be implemented, stated the Textile Mercury, if it were not 
for “the obstructionist attitude of the trade unions.”52  “Employers,” countered The 
Cotton Factory Times, “are the biggest obstacle to social and industrial reform.”53  In 
reality, however, neither group was committed to change.54   
Trade unionists feared rationalization because it often came with a loss of union 
power.  Workers worried that the shift from mule spinning to ring spinning would be a 
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 Fowler, Cotton Operatives, 128.   
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decline from skilled to semi-skilled labor, involving a loss of status and wages.55  The 
only reorganization that employers in Lancashire were willing to implement was the 
“more looms” system, where workers manned six or eight looms instead of two or four 
without a corresponding raise in wages.56  This system “seemed to confirm the view that 
reorganization meant simply more effective exploitation of labor.”57  Pro-Labour papers 
occasionally vilified the employers for resisting industrial reorganization,58 but in 
practice the workers, too, were unwilling to modernize.   
However, as historian Alan Fowler says, “the cotton trade union leaders of the 
interwar years can perhaps be forgiven for not responding in a more imaginative way to 
economic crisis for neither, after all, did their employers.”59  Joseph White argues that 
even in the prosperous years up to 1914, industrial magnates were not “disposed toward 
innovation and experimentation.”60  During the depression, when resources were scarce, 
employers were even less willing to risk money on industrial reorganization.61  Changes 
in technology, vertical integration, and lower prices were vehemently rejected as 
unnecessary and damaging.   
Lancashire cotton society was unwilling to see that changes in the rest of the 
world had made the factory system of the nineteenth century impractical.  Indeed, 
changes in the outside world were sometimes used as justification for resistance to 
rationalization.  As late as 1936, the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners Associations 
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was arguing that the rise in tariffs occurred because “every competing industry finds high 
protective tariffs necessary to keep Lancashire products out of their own country.”62  
Tariffs were proof, not that Lancashire needed to become more competitive in order to 
keep export levels up, but “that the vague and general charges of inefficiency leveled at 
our industry, even by men in responsible position [sic], are without foundation.”63 
Those changes in external conditions that Lancashire did acknowledge were seen 
as temporary, abnormal occurrences. The “pronounced and unhealthy growth” 64  of the 
Japanese and Indian textile industries were seen as being aided by tariffs and boycotts 
erected by nationalists who were impractical and unfair.65  These hindrances to “normal” 
trade relations, however, were for the most part perceived as momentary.66  Lancashire 
regarded the boycott and tariffs as aberrations that should disappear.  This led them into 
conflict with the British government, as employers and traders in the cotton industry 
simultaneously pressured London to crush the Indian nationalist movement and resisted 
governmental pressure for industrial reform.67   
External factors were used as excuses to avoid changing the status quo in the 
Lancashire factory system.  Throughout the cotton industry’s steady decline in the 
interwar years, both mill owners and mill operatives consistently and emphatically laid 
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the blame on causes that lay outside Lancashire.  In speaking of the nineteenth century, 
Patrick Joyce writes that the “idea of an external enemy was in fact very strong… 
particularly…in industries dependent on foreign trade [or] subject to foreign 
competition.”68  In the twentieth century, the cotton industry’s primary markets were 
India and China, which were increasingly being lost to Indian and Japanese competition.  
As a result, Indian tariffs, the boycott, and Japanese competition became three factors that 
were used by Lancashire as the sole explanation of the region’s waning economic 
power.69  “It would be a gross error,” the Burnley and District Weavers’, Winders’ and 
Warpers’ Journal stated, “to convey the impression that the depression in the cotton 
trade…is due solely to the out-of-dateness of our industry.”70  The Blackburn Cotton 
Employers’ Association informed the government in London that  
“the Government [would] be spending their time and energy more 
profitably in helping to improve the Cotton Trade if they would leave the 
question of Amalgamation and Re-organisation to the trade itself, and 
would concentrate their undivided attention on the six Clauses given 
above.”71  
 
The six clauses included excessive taxation, tariffs, monetary policy, and 
“lawlessness and disorder in the chief markets” (a clear reference to the Indian 
boycott).72  Industrialists and workers expected the government to prevent Indian 
nationalism and Japanese competition from threatening Lancashire trade.   
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Although several external factors were used by Lancashire to explain the trade 
depression,73 the Indian nationalist boycott received by far the most blame.  Statements 
such as that made by the Darwen Weavers’ Association Committee that  “10,000 people 
were unemployed in Darwen, mainly through the Indian boycott” were common.74  In 
April 1931, eight thousand people gathered in Blackburn “to inform the Government 
that…unless a firm stand is taken which will stamp out Sedition, Lawlessness and 
Disorder [in India], there can be no hope for a revival of the Lancashire Cotton Trade.”75  
This meeting was jointly run by the trade unions, employers’ association, and Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce. The venom directed toward the boycott was totally out of 
proportion to its effect on Lancashire’s trade, as Gandhi and others tried to argue.76  The 
focus on external causes, however, like resistance to rationalization and the evocation of 
traditional labour-employer relationships in the language of conciliation, was directly 
linked to the tendency of workers and employers to interpret their current situation in 
light of the nineteenth century.  
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 “Gandhi, the bania, the dealer in bargains” vs. “Gandhi, the idealist”77: the theory 
and the practice of khadi     
The 1929-32 boycott was the result of twenty years of Gandhi’s musing on the 
economic, spiritual, and political implications of Indian independence.  Gandhi’s ideas 
about independence were intimately linked to the concepts of swaraj, swadeshi, and 
khadi.  These terms must be defined before any exploration of Gandhi’s philosophy is 
possible.  Gandhi’s definition of swaraj differed from that of most other Indian 
nationalists.   Swaraj means self-rule, and for most nationalists, swaraj meant merely a 
political shift of power from the British to Indians.  Gandhi, however, disdained this idea 
of independence as “English rule without the Englishman.”78  Gandhi’s swaraj entailed a 
revolution in Indian cultural and economic life as well as in the political realm.  For 
Gandhi, swaraj could not be achieved without embracing swadeshi.  Swadeshi translates 
as “of one’s country” and is mostly used specifically in the context of goods being either 
foreign or swadeshi.  For the majority of Indian nationalists, any goods made in India 
qualified as swadeshi.  Gandhi, however, had a much more specific, spiritual definition of 
swadeshi.  For him, swadeshi meant “reliance on our own strength…the strength of our 
body, our mind and our soul.”79  Integral to this definition of swadeshi, particularly of 
swadeshi cloth, was the idea that swadeshi goods should not be produced in factories 
because factories were immoral and un-Indian.80  This definition of swadeshi led Gandhi 
to embrace khadi as the quintessential swadeshi product.  Khadi is usually translated as 
homespun cloth, although Gandhi’s rules for what qualified as khadi changed over time.  
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For Gandhi, the achievement of swaraj was predicated on pursuit of swadeshi, and, 
particularly, of khadi production. 
In Gandhi’s most developed, most theoretical articulations, swaraj, swadeshi, and 
khadi were inextricably intertwined practices.  In 1939, Gandhi told the Indian National 
Congress that “[k]hadi…is the symbol of unity of Indian humanity, of its economic 
freedom and equality and, therefore, ultimately, in the poetic expression of Jawaharlal 
Nehru, ‘the livery of India’s freedom.’”81  Khadi was nothing less than the physical 
incarnation of swaraj.  “Real home-rule,” Gandhi explained in Hind Swaraj (1909), “is 
self-rule or self-control.  The way to it is passive resistance: that is soul-force or love-
force.  In order to exert this force, Swadeshi in every sense is necessary.”82  Khadi was 
the most important swadeshi product for two reasons.  First, food and clothes were the 
two essentials of life and true swadeshi meant each person being able to provide him- or 
herself with those essentials.83  Second, spinning provided valuable time for meditation, 
so that everyone who spun could be led to the path of satya (truth) and ahimsa (non-
violence).84  For Gandhi, khadi was the perfection of swadeshi; swadeshi taught ahimsa; 
ahimsa was the only way to achieve swaraj.   
Although this was clearly the theoretical basis behind Gandhi’s championship of 
khadi, using this simple formula to describe his ideas is difficult because Gandhi stressed 
different aspects of his theory to different audiences.  Gandhi’s ideas about khadi were 
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not developed in a vacuum, although he did try to present his beliefs as “pure” and 
unsullied by economic or political considerations.  Gandhi’s shifting theory of khadi was 
a response, in part, to changing political and economic factors in India and England. In 
the spiritual, abstract realm, khadi, ahimsa, swadeshi, swaraj were all one.   In his 
political capacity, however, Gandhi might emphasize the economic necessity of khadi, 
the political expediency of boycott, or the traditional nativist value of swadeshi.   
The fully articulated theory of khadi and swaraj took quite some time to develop.  
Gandhi spent years grappling with different ideas on swaraj, India, and industrialization 
before arriving at his philosophy of khadi.  Gandhi’s attention to political matters, as well 
as his exposure to various religions, began while he lived in England in the early 1890s, 
studying to be a barrister.  It was in London that Gandhi discovered European critiques of 
Western industrialism.85  It was at this time that Gandhi also began to read Indian 
nationalist writings and discovered, among others, Romesh C. Dutt’s theory of the 
“economic drain” imposed by Britain on India.86  Gandhi took these ideas with him to 
South Africa, where he lived and worked until 1914.  It was in South Africa that Gandhi 
first employed satyagraha, usually translated as passive resistance or non-violent 
resistance,87 in opposition to the British government.  It was also in South Africa that he 
began to pay attention to the struggles of Indian nationalism in India, as well as elsewhere 
in the Empire.   
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Swadeshi was already part of the nationalist vocabulary when Gandhi began 
articulating his own ideas of swadeshi, which interacted with and diverged from previous 
incarnations of the idea.   Early nationalists88 advocated boycotting British cloth in favor 
of swadeshi cloth as a specific response to the historical relationship between the political 
and military subjugation of India and the economic exploitation of Indian raw cotton and 
suppression of the indigenous textile industry by the British.  The history of textiles in 
India was so fraught with nationalist tensions that Jawaharlal Nehru said that the “history 
of cotton and of textiles…might be considered the history of India.”89  The British had 
originally arrived in India as traders, in search of spices and Indians’ magnificently 
woven textiles.  Over time the British East India Company started interfering in local 
politics and in 1758 they were granted the diwan, or landlord rights, to the province of 
Bengal.  As the EIC, backed by the British Parliament, poured more money and more 
arms into settling new markets in India, the British gradually took political and military 
control over the entire sub-continent.  At the same time, the Industrial Revolution was 
gaining a foothold in Britain.  By the 1820s and 1830s, India’s textile production in 
Calcutta and similar cities had been squashed and India was converted into a producer of 
raw goods for the Lancashire factories.  In the late nineteenth century, Indian nationalists 
began to rediscover this history and to blame England for stifling India’s historic 
industry.90  Swadeshi was first advocated by Indian nationalists in the early twentieth 
century as being retributive justice as well as proving an invaluable tool with which to 
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pressure Britain.  Gandhi built on this earlier tradition of swadeshi even as he criticized it 
and enlarged upon it.  
Hind Swaraj, Gandhi’s first political manifesto, was written in 1909 while 
working and living in South Africa, but it explicitly addressed the nationalist movement 
in India.  Hind Swaraj contained a critique of industrialization, as well as of British rule 
and culture, and advocated a return to “traditional” Indian values.  Although he drew on 
earlier nationalist thought, Gandhi’s theories involved a radical departure from previous 
ideas of swaraj.  In Hind Swaraj, Gandhi paid tribute to the earlier generation of 
nationalist thinkers, such as Dadabhai Naoroji and Romesh Dutt.91  Yet while 
acknowledging their efforts, Gandhi criticized these nationalists for their lack of 
imagination in defining swaraj.  In the chapter in Hind Swaraj entitled, “What is 
Swaraj?” Gandhi claimed that an independence in which the British removed their 
political and military power from India but Indians continued to live like the British 
would be no independence at all.92  He was deeply critical of nationalists who wanted 
“English rule without the Englishman…that is to say, [who] would make India English, 
and when it becomes English, it will be called not Hindustan but Englistan.”93  Gandhi 
rejected predominant views of Britain as the superior society.  He represented India as an 
“Ancient Civilisation, which is the Kingdom of God.”94  To gain true swaraj, India must 
reject modern Western industrial madness. All the themes that were to be central to 
Gandhi’s promotion of khadi (with the exception of the idea of peasant uplift) were 
present in Hind Swaraj, but the relations between those ideas were not yet articulated. 
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When Hind Swaraj was written, Gandhi’s general theory of swadeshi had not yet 
become focused on khadi as the Indian industry.  In Hind Swaraj, Gandhi praised the 
Bengal swadeshi campaigns, but said that the boycott should have been “a boycott of all 
machine-made goods” rather than of just British goods.95 He argued that “it were better 
for us to send money to Manchester and to use flimsy Manchester cloth, than to multiply 
mills in India…[B]y reproducing Manchester in India, we shall keep our money at the 
price of our blood, because our very moral being will be sapped.”96  Here was a critique 
of industrialization as un-Indian and immoral, but at this point (1909), Gandhi saw textile 
mills as just one example among many of the “bane of civilization.”97  
Hind Swaraj, although it carries a lot of weight as Gandhi’s only political 
manifesto,98 was an early piece of work, written about India at a point when Gandhi was 
only familiar with India’s political and economic situation from a distance.  It was only 
once he began working in India after 1915 that Gandhi began to focus on textiles as the 
key issue in the struggle for swaraj.  Gandhi quickly became involved in the politics of 
Ahmadabad, one of the biggest mill towns in India.  He built his ashram on the outskirts 
of Ahmedabad, and developed relationships with textile workers and mill owners.  
Gandhi’s work with the textile workers in the strikes of 1917 was the first example of 
Gandhi’s incorporation of social groups that were ignored by other nationalists.99  
Ahmedabad provided Gandhi with an opportunity to explore the textile industry he had 
criticized so sharply in Hind Swaraj. 
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Gandhi’s work in Ahmedabad was the beginning of a relationship with Indian 
industrialists that was constantly being renegotiated.  The growth of the textile industry 
after World War I in Bombay, Ahmedabad, and other cities had made Indian mill owners 
a significant group in Indian politics.100  Traditionally, industrialists had aligned 
themselves with the British government, rather than with nationalist opposition.101  Since 
Gandhi knew the mill owners would not support nationalist politics,102 he felt 
comfortable in his early writings condemning the use of industrial cloth wholesale.  But 
industrialists' political positions shifted during the 1920s and ’30s, and Gandhi’s rhetoric 
on industrialization vacillated in response to these shifts.  He never retreated from his 
belief that industry was immoral, but he was willing to moderate his rhetoric when he felt 
that industrialists might endorse the nationalist movement.103  During Gandhi’s work in 
Ahmedabad in 1917, he developed several lifelong friends and political supporters among 
the mill owners. These industrialists were instrumental in funding Gandhi’s ashram, as 
well as his peasant education efforts and khadi production.104   By the 1930s, many 
industrialists, in Bombay and other cities as well as in Ahmedabad, felt that the benefits 
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of supporting the nationalist movement now outweighed the dangers of doing so.105  
Many industrialists participated in the 1929-32 boycott though they had not in the INC’s 
swadeshi movement of 1919-22.  Despite Gandhi’s involvement with mill owners from 
1917 onwards, he always downplayed these connections to focus on what he saw as his 
most important work: his involvement with Indian peasants. 
Throughout his career in Indian politics, Gandhi was very involved with 
improving conditions of life for Indian peasants.106  Gandhi argued that the pure, Indian 
villages were being impoverished by the corrupt, industrialized, Westernized cities.107  
Khadi production was, for Gandhi, the ideal tool with which to return India to its 
previous state of sacred, self-sufficient village communities that had no need of foreign 
trade, cities, or industry—“the village of my dreams,” Gandhi called it.108  The peasants 
needed “a daily task that is not mere drudgery,” and khadi was the perfect instrument.109  
To create his ideal villages, Gandhi organized groups to reach out to marginalized 
communities of peasants, especially peasant women, bringing them “the message of the 
spinning-wheel.”110  He saw this “constructive programme,” as he called it, as central to 
the attainment of swaraj.111  
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By the mid-1910s, Gandhi had the “theology” of khadi112 worked out, but the 
practicalities continued to daunt him.  In his Autobiography, Gandhi detailed how 
difficult it was for him to find the technology and the knowledge needed for hand-
spinning and hand-weaving.113  Gandhi later admitted that although he advocated khadi 
“as the panacea for the growing pauperism of India” as early as 1908, he had only seen a 
handloom or spinning wheel once in his life at that point.114  The ashram he founded did 
not begin to manufacture woven cloth until 1917 and it took almost another two years 
before Gandhi could find a spinning wheel and someone who could teach hand-spinning. 
During that time the ashram produced what it called khadi, although it used mill-spun 
yarn.  Only by the end of 1918 did the ashram define khadi as hand-spun and hand-
woven, although for political purposes Gandhi moderated this definition outside the 
ashram.115 
Although not all Gandhi’s ideas on khadi were accepted outside his ashram, khadi 
in a looser sense did become central to the Indian National Congress’s opposition to 
British rule from the 1920s through independence.  After the 1920s, khadi was always a 
visual symbol of INC resistance.116  The spinning wheel appeared on the flags adopted by 
the Indian National Congress in 1921 and 1931.117  To this day, official versions of the 
Indian flag must be made of khadi.118   
The INC’s first engagement with Gandhi’s ideas of khadi and ahimsa occurred 
during the 1919-1924 non-cooperation movement.  In many ways, this movement was a 
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predecessor to the 1929-1932 civil disobedience movement and provided an opportunity 
for Gandhi and the INC to work out the practices of boycott and satyagraha.  Although 
swadeshi was adopted by the INC, Gandhi felt that “[k]hadi had not as yet found its 
proper place.”119  The resolution adopted by the INC in 1920 framed khadi as the 
expedient back-up for the industrial swadeshi production.  It stated:  
“This Congress advises the adoption of swadeshi in piecegoods on a vast 
scale and inasmuch as the existing mills of India with the indigenous 
capital and control do not manufacture sufficient yarn and sufficient cloth 
for the requirements of the nation…this Congress advises immediate 
stimulation of further manufacture by means of reviving handspinnning in 
every house and handweaving on the part of millions of weavers.”120   
 
Even this minimal support for khadi was to prove temporary.  By 1922, the non-
cooperation movement had lost momentum and by 1924 was officially declared over. 
The INC’s endorsement of khadi was always contingent on its effectiveness as a 
political tool.  During times when resistance to the British was widespread there was a 
rise of organizations and resolutions supporting khadi.  But during the periods of less 
antagonistic policies, when the INC’s executive committee was not directly under 
Gandhi’s influence, khadi ceased to be a focus of INC action.  Thus, the non-cooperation 
movement of the early 1920s saw the creation of a Khaddar (Khadi) Board to increase 
education and production of khadi throughout India and the passing of a resolution that 
all Congress representatives must wear and spin khadi.121  Once non-cooperation ended, 
however, the resolution was repealed and the Khaddar Board suspended.122  
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Gandhi continued his work with khadi even without the INC’s support.  With the 
end of non-cooperation, Gandhi “retired” from politics (something he was to do many 
times during his career as India’s foremost politician) and returned to his ashram.  There 
he set about continuing his constructive work outside the formal apparatus of Congress.  
He founded the All-India Spinners’ Association (ostensibly not a Congress operation, 
although run by several Congress members) to replace the Khaddar Board.123  During the 
“lull” period of the mid and late 1920s, Gandhi concentrated on the spiritual and social 
impacts of khadi and cultivated a network in the villages of peasants who were to be 
instrumental in the 1929-32 boycott.  
By the end of the twenties, the INC was again ready for a major push against 
British power. The younger members of the INC, including Jawaharlal Nehru, were 
impatient with continued delays in implementing the new Indian Constitution.  Indian 
nationalists particularly resented the high-handed nature of the Simon Commission of 
1927, which was intended to review Indian conditions to determine the measure of self-
government in the new constitution, and which totally excluded Indian advisers.124  In 
1929, the Congress resolved to begin a campaign of civil disobedience to push for purna 
swaraj, or complete independence (as opposed to greater political autonomy within the 
Commonwealth).  As the INC prepared for nationwide action, they appealed to Gandhi to 
return to command.  Seeing that he was now in a position to push his agenda, Gandhi 
agreed.  As with the earlier non-cooperation movement, the civil disobedience movement 
included an endorsement of swadeshi.  In order to put extra pressure on the British, 
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Gandhi agreed to limit the boycott to British, rather than all foreign, goods125 and to 
broaden the definition of khadi to include all Indian manufactured cloth, not merely hand-
spun and/or hand-woven.126   
Many people who took part in the 1929-1932 civil disobedience movement had 
never participated before in nationalist action.   Peasants involved in Gandhi’s khadi 
education network were mobilized, as were mill owners in the cities, and the traditional 
professional elite of the INC.  The movement had an unprecedented geographical and 
social breadth.  One measure of the strength of local support networks Gandhi had built 
up was that when all the major leaders of the INC were arrested civil disobedience 
continued with just as much, or more, fervor than previously.127   
The civil disobedience movement had such an effect in both India and England 
that in February of 1931, Gandhi was invited to meet with the Viceroy of India, Lord 
Irwin, in an attempt to come to some accommodation. Over many days of negotiations, 
Gandhi and Irwin finally agreed on certain compromises.128  Gandhi agreed to expand the 
boycott to include all foreign-produced cloth, instead of limiting it to British goods,129 to 
end violent or coercive picketing,130 and to end civil disobedience for the time being.131  
In return, Irwin agreed to release several political prisoners and to countenance the 
continued boycott in its altered form.132  He also offered an invitation to Gandhi to attend 
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the Round Table Conference in England to participate in the discussions about a new 
constitution for India.  Accordingly (and after months of indecision), on Saturday, August 
29, 1931, Gandhi embarked on the S.S. Rajputana to travel to London and ultimately to 
Lancashire to engage in “friendly discussions”133 with those who blamed him the loss of 
their livelihood. 
Anticipations: Lancashire and Gandhi’s differing understandings of the purpose of 
the visit 
Although Gandhi and Lancashire spokesmen talked about communication, they 
anticipated very different outcomes from the conversations.  Operatives and mill owners 
expected that discussions with Lancashire workers would lead Gandhi to realize the 
boycott’s devastating impact on the textile industry and to end the boycott.  This idea was 
present from the first moment of invitation, when Andrews suggested that the discussions 
between Lancashire and India “might lead to some fair division of trade on behalf of 
labour.”134  Despite his sympathy for Indian nationalism, Andrews felt that the boycott 
was “hitting below the belt” in “a double act of violence not merely hitting Lancashire, 
but hitting England also” and was, therefore, not in accord with Gandhi’s principle of 
ahimsa, or non-violence.135  Andrews believed, and encouraged the Lancashire 
community to believe, that Gandhi would end the boycott once he saw its effects 
firsthand.  The outrage expressed by The Darwen News the week after Gandhi’s visit 
reveals the light in which Lancashire viewed the “communication” that was to have taken 
place: 
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“The impression conveyed to the majority of people here was that the visit 
was with a view to any misunderstandings or differences being dissolved in 
the hope that our trading relations with India might ultimately be re-
established.”136   
 
The belief that Gandhi would end the boycott once he saw Lancashire’s poverty was 
advanced by Andrews, but had deeper roots in Lancashire’s belief about the power of 
conciliation and misconceptions about the nature of Gandhi’s mission in India.   
In declarations about the visit made by trade union representatives, mill owners, 
and newspaper reporters, cotton society revealed the fervent belief that face-to-face 
communication would solve all the conflict between Lancashire and India. In the weeks 
prior to Gandhi’s visit, friendliness was advocated by people of all political backgrounds 
and social positions.  The Conservative Textile Mercury, which over the previous months 
consistently had cast aspersions on Indian nationalists’ ethics and intelligence, cautioned 
their readers that “it was of vital importance that any comments on the case…should be 
framed so as not to risk prejudicing the friendly discussions which we all hope will be 
arranged.”137  Luke Bates, Mayor of Blackburn and Secretary of the Blackburn Weavers’ 
Association, who had said in February that he “could not regard him [Gandhi] as a friend 
of Lancashire,”138 in September advised that Gandhi “should be welcomed.”139  This was 
not hypocrisy.  Rather, Bates’ turn-around stemmed from the belief, widespread in 
Lancashire, that Gandhi should be welcomed because “his visit would be productive of 
considerable good;”140 that is, that his visit would result in an end to the boycott, and 
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hence, to Lancashire’s depression.  “Friendly discussion,”141 “candid” and “frank” 
conversations142 were seen as a panacea to solve even the worst of Lancashire’s 
economic problems.   
The idea that Gandhi would effect an about-face in his policy as a result of the 
visit gained strength from the romanticization of Gandhi as a humanitarian and a friend of 
the peasant/worker.  The Darwen News explained the impetus behind mill owner Corder 
Catchpool’s invitation:  “Mr. Gandhi has a heart that quickly responds to the sight of 
human suffering and poverty, and Mr. Catchpool’s idea was that he should come and see 
for himself what the effect of the Indian boycott and the cotton duties was upon 
Lancashire.”143  Bates said that “if Gandhi could see for himself the devastating effect of 
his policy among the Lancashire cotton operatives…he, as a humanitarian and a deeply 
religious man, would realise what our grievance is.”144    
The idea of Gandhi as humanitarian is one area in which social and political 
differences between the newspapers are articulated.  The pro-Labour newspapers aimed 
at the working class tended to emphasize Gandhi’s support of the “voiceless millions” of 
Indian peasants.  In these newspapers, Gandhi’s support of the Indian peasants was 
interpreted to mean that he would also support Lancashire’s working class.  The Cotton 
Factory Times explained that hopes for the visit were based on “the fact that Gandhi is 
the friend of the poor in all climes.”145  If Gandhi was “aflame in the interests of the 
poorest of the poor,” then, reasoned George Brame, secretary of the Clitheroe Weavers, 
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Winders and Warpers’ Association, he would not inflict further economic devastation on 
Lancashire once he saw the misery of the unemployed mill workers.146  Less political 
working-class newspapers merely cited Gandhi as a humanitarian, not stressing his 
championing of peasants.  The Textile Mercury, the Conservative, upper-class 
newspaper, did not emphasize either Gandhi’s status as a humanitarian or his interest in 
improving peasant life.   Its hopes for the visit were expressed only in terms of personal 
interaction and exchanges of opinion.  The identification of Gandhi as a friend of the 
peasant (or the lower classes) was specific to the working-class papers.  The idea that 
Gandhi’s humanitarianism would lead him to end the boycott demonstrates the failure of 
textile workers and industrialists to appreciate the difference between Lancashire poverty 
and the poverty of the Indian peasants, to understand the nationalist impetus behind the 
boycott, or to consider the spiritual facet of Gandhi’s anti-industrial policy.   
Gandhi, while using similar language of friendship and dialogue, had objectives 
for the visit that were in direct conflict with Lancashire’s expectations.  Gandhi intended 
to educate his Lancashire audience about the purpose of the boycott, the intentions of 
Indian nationalism, and the exploitative nature of British imperialism.  He also hoped to 
gain support among the British electorate, particularly amongst the working class, for 
Indian independence.  This hope was encouraged by Andrews in his initial proposal for 
the visit.  In his letter to Gandhi, Andrews argued that Gandhi “could get his own position 
with regard to the freedom of India much more generously recognised in this country” if 
he ended the boycott.147  While Gandhi had no intentions of buying British support by 
ending the boycott, he did hope that he could convince British citizens, especially the 
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working class, to see the justice in Indian independence. His trip to Lancashire was of a 
piece with this larger goal.   
Gandhi’s plans for his visit to England had very little to do with the Round Table 
Conference, and much more to do with exposing his British audience to the ideals of (his 
own) Indian nationalism.  From the beginning, Gandhi had little faith in the constitutional 
negotiations of the Round Table Conference.  He did not trust “the unbending and 
unbendable…Government” to provide any substantial changes to India’s status.148  He 
also felt that a “merely” constitutional swaraj, without economic and spiritual self-
sufficiency for every Indian, was meaningless.149  While in England, Gandhi tried “to 
show to every Englishman and Englishwoman [he met] that what the Congress stands for 
is what is deserved by India.”150  Often he framed his mission in populist terms; Gandhi 
claimed to be “the sole representative of those half-starved, half-naked dumb millions” of 
Indian peasants.151  He was particularly interested in bringing his message to the working 
class of England.152  Thus he chose (at great inconvenience to everyone else associated 
with the Round Table Conference) to live in a settlement house in the East End.153  
During his stay in London, he frequently reiterated to correspondents and the press the 
joy he and the East-Enders took in each others’ company and how he was able to explain 
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India’s position to them.154  One day he was able to teach the children in the 
neighborhood about ahimsa and common roots between Sanskrit and English words.155  
For Gandhi, the important task of his visit to England was to “place before the British 
public the Case for India.”156   
But educating unemployed Lancashire workers was especially important and 
would take extra effort.  In Lancashire, Gandhi had not only to combat general prejudice 
and misinformation about Indian nationalism, but to confront the deeply held assertion 
that his actions were depriving thousands of their livelihood.  An English friend of 
Gandhi’s, according to Gandhi’s newspaper Young India, claimed that it was “not 
possible for men and women under such conditions to take a balanced or rational view of 
things or policies!”157  But Gandhi was determined to convince Lancashire society of the 
justness of his demands by seeing “as much as possible of working people there who are 
engaged in the cotton trade and [getting] with them face to face and heart to heart.”158  
Gandhi intended to explain his beliefs about swadeshi and swaraj to Lancashire workers 
and industrialists.  In an interview with the Press prior to the visit, Gandhi said that, 
“there is so much misunderstanding [in Lancashire] about what we have done with 
foreign cloth.  If I went up there and talked with them I should be cross-examined, and 
would speak to them without reserve.”159  Gandhi’s aim in going to Lancashire was not, 
as Charles Andrews and Lancashire society hoped, to “learn the facts of the position of 
Lancashire and how the policy of the All-India Congress has affected that position” so 
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that he would take pity on Lancashire and end the boycott.160  He was merely going to 
Lancashire in an attempt to alleviate any bitterness there by educating the public about 
his ideas about swadeshi and swaraj.   
 Education was Gandhi’s primary goal, but secondary to that was the hope that by 
explaining his mission Gandhi could persuade English people to support swaraj.   In an 
article entitled “What I Want,” published in The Evening Standard, Gandhi stated, “What 
I want is peace for India.  I want the people of Britain to help me.”161  In Lancashire, he 
told his audience, “I am powerless to do anything without the active co-operation of 
Lancashire and then of Englishmen in other parts of Great Britain.”162  Gandhi said,  “I 
am…acquaint[ing] myself with their [British] mentality, and trying to give them as I 
know it the correct situation in India.”163  By countering “the vicious propaganda going 
on today in England to prejudice the Indian cause,” Gandhi hoped to see “the creation of 
goodwill between the two countries.”164   
“Disappointment”165: the failure of communication between Gandhi and cotton 
society 
In spite of efforts on both sides to create amity between Lancashire and India, 
Gandhi and Lancashire mill workers and mill owners had such different visions of the 
past and the future that they could not communicate effectively about the causes and 
solutions to the boycott.  Cotton society would not relinquish their romanticization of 
Lancashire’s economic past and they insisted on interpreting the Indian boycott as a 
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momentary irregularity in Lancashire’s normal export business.  Even when Lancashire 
heard Gandhi’s arguments about the necessity of the boycott (for instance, trade union 
leaders sympathized with Gandhi’s attempts to alleviate the condition of the Indian 
peasants) they misinterpreted the context, minimizing the spiritual and nationalist aspects 
of the boycott.   
Narrow Nationalism vs. Peasant Uplift: the dispute over the nature of the boycott 
Lancashire cotton society refused to accept Gandhi’s interpretation of the boycott 
as a movement comprising economic, political, and spiritual motivations.  According to 
the nationalist newspaper Young India, Gandhi “poured out his heart before them 
[Lancashire workers] for three quarters of an hour—describing how economics and ethics 
and politics were in his life inextricably mixed up.”166  This message was completely lost 
on the Lancashire audience, who insisted on making distinctions between what they 
called the “political boycott” and the “economic boycott.”  The phrase “political boycott” 
was used by the English to designate the “narrow nationalism” that specifically targeted 
Lancashire cloth products.167  The term “economic boycott,” on the other hand, was used 
to indicate a free-trade choice not to buy British goods but to support native industry.168  
This misconception then allowed cotton society to dismiss the strength of the boycott 
movement.  Once people in Lancashire categorized the boycott as either economic 
opportunism or political maneuvering, they argued that Indians could be threatened or 
cajoled into abandoning it.  If the boycott were merely a political move by a minority, 
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then presumably it could be crushed by sufficient force from the English government.169  
Alternatively, if the boycott were exclusively an attempt to create a solution to India’s 
economic problems, then alternate industries could be developed in India that would not 
compete with Lancashire textiles.  For instance, George Brame suggested that the Indian 
peasants might charge more for their rice instead of weaving cotton.170  Mill owners and 
workers saw the “economic boycott” as negligible and focused on the “political boycott,” 
instead of seeing the boycott as a movement that integrated various concerns in Indian 
society.  Creating a distinction between economic and political boycott allowed 
Lancashire commentators to marginalize the boycott as the work of a small group of 
malicious nationalists who bullied the rest of India into sabotaging their own economy.171 
Representatives of the cotton industry attacked the boycott as a form of 
“narrow,”172 “dangerous”173 nationalism that specifically targeted English, and indeed 
Lancashire, cloth products.  Depictions of the boycott as the work of a small group of 
malicious nationalists were common.  The Cotton Factory Times’ commercial 
correspondent in Calcutta declared that the Congress used social exclusion to “stifle any 
cry of dissent, so that though Congress represents actually only a minority, it has been 
able to deceive the world into believing that its demand is a unanimous Indian one.”174  
“As regards resumption of business with Manchester,” he concluded, “political 
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conditions alone hinder it.”175  The interpretation of the INC as a small group that forced 
other Indians to comply with their nefarious designs bolstered Lancashire’s conviction 
that the boycott was a deviant campaign, which would soon collapse, allowing trading 
patterns to return to normal.   
During the visit, Gandhi responded to Lancashire’s characterization of the boycott 
as a narrow and selfish political policy by stressing that the boycott was fueled by a 
mixture of political, economic, and spiritual concerns.  He introduced to Lancashire the 
idea of the constructive, or “peasant uplift,” program.  Gandhi refuted Lancashire’s claim 
that Indian nationalists were motivated by selfish interests by claiming that the Indian 
nationalist movement, and specifically the boycott, was initiated in the interests of Indian 
peasants.  Throughout his visit, Gandhi spoke to the British public as the sole 
representative of the Congress and portrayed the Congress as giving voice to the 
unexpressed yearnings of the peasants, who could not speak for themselves.  The INC 
was, he argued, “essentially a peasant organization” in that it “represent[ed], in its 
essence, the dumb, semi-starved millions scattered over the length and breadth of the land 
in its 700,000 villages…[and would] sacrifice every interest for the sake of the interests 
of these dumb millions.”176  It was those “dumb and starving millions” for whom Gandhi 
had come to claim “freedom unadulterated” and in whose interests the boycott was 
carried out.177  Gandhi countered claims of swadeshi being a “dangerous form of 
nationalism”178 by arguing that it was the only solution to the problem of Indian poverty.  
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He explained the economic arrangements that left Indian peasants unemployed for six 
months of the year and the program of spinning and weaving that he tried to implement 
as a palliative to this poverty.  He regretted the effects of the boycott on Lancashire, but 
was consoled by the fact that it was, as he told the mill owners,  “a result of the steps I 
took, and had to take, as part of my duty towards the…starving millions of India.”179   
“Symbol of Salvation”180: Gandhi explains and Lancashire ignores the spiritual 
implications of khadi 
Lancashire cotton society refused to listen to what Gandhi said about swadeshi as 
a spiritual program.  Even as representatives of the cotton industry absorbed Gandhi’s 
message of peasant uplift, they ignored or distorted other aspects of his argument.  T. D. 
Barlow, chairman of the main employers’ association, said that, as a result of the visit, 
Lancashire now understood that the boycott was not merely political but “was also of 
great social significance.”181  Yet in spite of Lancashire society’s sense of gaining a new 
appreciation of the social implications of Gandhi’s mission, industrialists and trade 
unionists still dismissed the idea that there was a spiritual aspect of the boycott.   Young 
India reported that Gandhi told Lancashire that he could “take before them [the peasants] 
a message of God only by taking the message of sacred work before them.”182  In 
Lancashire newspapers, the idea that spinning is “sacred work” was entirely lost, as was 
the idea that Gandhi saw khadi as bringing God to the peasants.  What Gandhi articulated 
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as a spiritual cleansing, “an entirely self-purifactory endeavour,”183 Lancashire 
reinterpreted as social or economic reform.   
The extent to which Barlow and his cohort failed to understand Gandhi’s 
intentions is revealed in Barlow’s musing that “M [sic] Gandhi would, he presumed, 
accept any alternative craft that would provide what he was seeking to achieve—
enlargement and economic betterment of the peasant life.”184  This idea, which was 
echoed by George Brame, a trade unionist, does not take into account Gandhi’s statement 
in the Daily Herald (a London-based paper) that the “spinning wheel is for India’s 
starving millions the symbol of salvation.”185  When representatives of the cotton 
industry did note the spiritual aspect, it was only to denigrate it.186  The most benign 
judgment Lancashire passed on Gandhi’s spiritual ideas was that they were “sincere 
enough, but for the most part impractical.”187   
“A Historical Fact”: Gandhi and Lancashire contest the nature of British 
imperialism 
Representatives of the cotton industry argued that while Gandhi’s aims for 
peasant uplift were worthwhile, the boycott was not a responsible or appropriate solution.   
T. D. Barlow argued that although Lancashire “must sympathise” with Gandhi’s peasant 
uplift program, “the boycott has cut off a trade which it has taken generations to build up 
and the results to those dependent on that trade are catastrophic.”188  In almost the same 
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words, George Brame told Gandhi that although trade unionists “had every sympathy 
with Mr. Gandhi in his efforts to try and uplift that class…the system he [Gandhi] was 
putting into operation was certainly having grievous results upon Lancashire cotton 
operatives generally.”189  Spokesmen for the cotton industry persisted in believing that 
Lancashire’s trade with India should continue unabated without harming Indian interests, 
and that the boycott was a thoughtless, destructive impulse.    
The criticism of Gandhi’s methods often led into the argument that Gandhi did 
not understand (as Lancashire industrialists did) the forces with which he was working.  
Barlow worried that “Mr. Gandhi must find it difficult to differentiate between the 
political aspirations of Congress and their economic effects.”190  At the opposite end of 
the political spectrum from Barlow, “Rover,” the weekly commentator of the Cotton 
Factory Times, stated that “in his effort to secure the independence of his country, 
Gandhi is ignoring the all-important economic laws which are the real basis of the 
problem of India.”191  Lancashire spokesmen were impressed by “the sincerity and 
earnestness of the little man in the loin cloth” but felt that but he was “grasping at the 
shadow and missing the substance.”192  The secretary of the Heywood Cardroom 
Association argued that Gandhi was mistaken in his tactics because the boycott was “in 
no way calculated to assist India toward independence.”193  The portrayal of Gandhi as a 
naïve player in a vastly complicated economic and political game bolstered Lancashire’s 
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argument that Indians were not yet ready for independence and that “any withdrawal of 
British power from India will open the way to a period of prolonged conflict.”194 
One of the manifestations of Lancashire’s commitment to the standards of the 
nineteenth century was the belief that the imperial relations of the nineteenth century 
were beneficial and normative.  The premise that empire (and imperial trading patterns) 
was good for colonial subjects and for England was accepted by almost everyone.  An 
editorial in the Manchester Guardian rejoiced that “Lancashire’s rightful heritage to a fair 
share of the Indian market does not conflict with Great Britain’s trusteeship for the 
welfare of India as a whole.”195  Opposition to the boycott, raised tariffs, and the growth 
of the Indian mill industry was couched as paternalist protection of “masses of Indians, 
who are undoubtedly suffering” from the ill-conceived plans of self-absorbed Indian 
nationalists and industrialists.196  Spokesmen for the cotton industry argued that the 
boycott harmed Indians as much as it did the English.  “If...the door is barred to goods 
that are not [of] Indian origin, the natives themselves are going to be the sufferers,” 
warned the Textile Mercury.197  The Manchester Chamber of Commerce elaborated on 
this argument: 
“India raw cotton exports will suffer if Lancashire doesn’t buy them; other 
Indian exports will suffer if Britain can’t buy them because of 
unemployment; Indian consumers will suffer if British goods aren’t there 
on a free market to compete with Indian goods.”198  
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In contrast to the wise, responsible, caring Lancashire industrialists, Indian nationalists 
were portrayed as either naïve or conniving.199  It was in this light that John Grey, a mill 
owner, stated his opinion that “Mr Gandhi does not, I suggest, appreciate fully the 
power” of the forces with which he was meddling.200  Only English rule (and Lancashire 
cotton) could save Indians from themselves. 
 There was a difference, however, between Conservative and Labour 
interpretations of benevolent empire.  While both envisioned a return to the past in terms 
of the relationship between Lancashire and India, they had different routes to get there.  
Conservatives focused on suppressing the Indian nationalist movement by force.  They 
identified the Indian nationalist movement as “evil”201 and painted Lancashire as an 
innocent “victim of political passion and prejudice.”202  They wanted the British 
government to return to a more dictatorial relationship with India by ending the Indian 
Government’s fiscal autonomy and “securing the complete elimination of the Boycott of 
British Goods and Picketing.”203  Major tensions developed between industrial interests 
and the London government as the mill owners pressured the government to turn the 
clock back in imperial relationships.204  One member of the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce wrote that to “rely solely on what is called a policy of goodwill, but which is 
really a unilateral policy of concessions on the part of Great Britain…is to fly in the face 
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of all the teachings of history.”205   The London government was continually fending off 
accusations that the British government had abandoned Lancashire cotton interests.206  
The Manchester Chamber of Commerce declared that “[t]he Joint Select Committee is 
concerned with the future good Government of India from the point of view of Indian and 
British interests equally.”207  But, it continued, “[i]t cannot be questioned that the British 
Parliament is under an obligation to avoid any situation which would imperil the 
existence of the cotton trade.”208   
Labour and Socialist commentators tended to be more accommodating, 
advocating cooperation within the empire. Leftist workers stressed worker solidarity, 
even if this was mostly rhetoric.209  The trade unionist George Brame, in his interview 
with Gandhi “pointed out the sympathy the deputation had for the Indian 
people…and…with Mr. Gandhi in his efforts to try and uplift that class.”210  They talked 
more about acknowledging the legitimate demands of Indian nationalists (it is uncertain 
which demands they considered legitimate and which illegitimate).  Liberal and Labour 
cotton society opposed “the rank, overbearing attitude of Winston Churchill and his 
kind.”211  In the end, however, despite differences of accent, all of Lancashire society saw 
the imperial relationship as benevolent and inevitable. 
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 While in Lancashire, Gandhi attempted to provide an alternate history of British 
rule and the role of economic imperialism in India, which was largely ignored in the 
Lancashire papers.  Young India reported that while in England Gandhi “combated the 
preconceived notions and the hardened prejudices of even educated Britishers who were 
systematically being taught false history.”212  Gandhi blamed British rule for making 
India “progressively poor and emasculate” economically, politically, and militarily.213  
He specifically blamed the East India Company for ruining the village industries and 
linked the EIC’s exploitation to Lancashire’s wealth.214  Therefore, Gandhi argued, the 
khadi movement was “an appeal to go back to our former calling.”215  Gandhi declared 
that the khadi movement was a return to the true, glorious past of India’s prosperous, 
autonomous village system that had been destroyed by British rule.  This was a direct 
repudiation of Lancashire’s version of a history of benevolent, natural economic relations 
within an imperial framework in which both India and Lancashire benefited and in which 
the nationalist boycott was an unnatural aberration from traditional trade relations.  In 
Gandhi’s paradigm, England’s current deprivation was merely the result of Indians 
reclaiming their birthright.216  Gandhi “urged that England must not build her happiness 
on the tombs of millions as she had done.”217  Lancashire was not eager to hear Gandhi’s 
version of history, which denied Lancashire’s right to the Indian textile market.  On the 
few occasions that Lancashire newspapers noted Gandhi’s alternate history, they 
dismissed it as entirely Gandhi’s peculiar, erroneous viewpoint.218  
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“Cold Comfort from Mr Gandhi”219: Lancashire rejects Gandhi’s overtures 
As we have seen, one of Gandhi’s goals for the visit was to create support in 
Lancashire for the INC.  To this end, Gandhi repeatedly presented to Lancashire a 
scenario under which the British cotton industry could regain a certain amount of their 
trade with India.  He remained quite clear that “Lancashire…could never hope to get 
back to the quantity of goods formerly supplied to India.”220  However, “supposing there 
were a full-hearted settlement with India and supposing India had to buy foreign cloth to 
supplement indigenous homespun and mill-spun, preference would be given to 
Lancashire over all other foreign cloth.”221  Gandhi hoped to win political support for 
Indian independence by presenting it as something that would benefit Lancashire 
economically.  “What will conduce to the prosperity of Great Britain, the economic 
freedom of Great Britain,” he asked, “an enslaved but rebellious India, or an India an 
esteemed partner with Britain?”222  He promised that an independent India would “deal 
with England as a partner.”223  Gandhi’s repeated emphasis on partnership and 
friendliness between England and India were intended to counter British fears that an 
independent India would impose vengeful economic restrictions on British trade.   “I 
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have come to give you fair trade,” he promised Lancashire, “[b]ut, if I go without giving 
it, it will not be through any fault of mine.”224 
In the end, however, Gandhi was to leave Lancashire without giving them “fair 
trade,” as Lancashire cotton society completely scorned what it saw as Gandhi’s minimal 
concessions.  The Clitheroe Advertiser and Times reported that Gandhi “made an 
important statement concerning his Lancashire tour and the prospects—slight indeed—of 
help from India being forthcoming.”225  The Darwen Advertiser angrily rejected Gandhi’s 
offer: “[W]hat he [Gandhi] may do for ‘the suffering operative’ will, to our mind, neither 
start a solitary loom nor sell a single piece of cloth.”226  The expectation of economic 
revival, the view of Indian nationalism as a fleeting and deviant phenomenon, and the 
persistent clinging to idealized nineteenth century standards as normative led Lancashire 
to reject Gandhi’s offer because it did not suit their imagined scenario of what the volume 
of Lancashire-India trade ought to be.  What Gandhi characterized as “the old Lancashire 
trade,”227 the Blackburn Northern Daily Telegraph described as “ordinary trading 
relations.”228  Lancashire society firmly believed that the market would return to 
“normal;” that is, the total dominance of the Indian market that had existed during the 
heyday of empire.  Anything short of this was unacceptable.  The limitations imposed on 
the cotton industry and on Gandhi by Lancashire’s commitment to competing visions of 
the past and future ensured that no real communication ensued between Gandhi and his 
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Lancashire audience.  As The Darwen News put it, “Mr. Gandhi has seen Lancashire, and 
Lancashire has seen Mr. Gandhi, and there is the end of it.”229   
Conclusion: 
 Today Gandhi’s visit to Lancashire survives in a few photographs decorating 
books of Lancashire history, but receives almost no critical attention.  Even a month after 
the visit, the principal actors in Lancashire had, to all appearances, already forgotten it.  
In 1933, several Lancashire industrialists traveled to India to hold “conversations [of] the 
greatest cordiality” with Indian mill owners in the hopes of achieving  “a satisfactory 
settlement of the Indo-Lancashire textile question.”230  The language and hopes of the 
Lancashire mill owners remained the same as it had been in 1931, yet no mention of the 
failed visit of Gandhi to Lancashire was made.  If the visit produced no tangible results 
and soon faded into obscurity, why should historians study it?  It is precisely because the 
visit was a failure that it should be of interest.  Recent historical studies have looked at 
how marginalized subjects (women, non-whites, non-Protestants) within the empire 
interacted with each other, in reaction to or in concert with the imperial state.231  Books 
and articles have proliferated in the last ten years or so exploring communication and 
exchange between British suffragists, Irish nationalists, Theosophists, and Indian 
nationalists, among others.  While some of these historians include the caveat that 
“moments of cross-national contact between native intellectuals were…often sporadic 
and impressionistic [and] also highly context-specific,” other authors overlook the extent 
to which nationalists, even in moments of cross-cultural communication “were primarily 
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concerned with their own particular projects of self-definition and/or anti-colonial 
subversion.”232  The moment of contact between Lancashire mill workers and owners and 
Gandhi provides an excellent example of the failure of historical actors to transcend their 
own historical and cultural contexts.  Although participants spoke of a desire to create a 
space for dialogue, the context-specific preconceptions each party brought to the 
encounter precluded any possibility of true communication.   
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